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PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING 
1. Davis County as plaintiff/appellant. 
2. Progressive Northwestern Insurance Company (hereinafter "Progressive") 
defendant/appellee. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code 
Annotated § 78-2-2(3)(j). This matter was poured over to the Utah Court of Appeals 
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 78-2-2(4). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES FOR REVIEW 
Progressive agrees with plaintiffs statement that the trial court's ruling on 
summary judgment presents to the appellate court for review conclusions of law which 
are reviewed for correctness. U.R.C.P 56(c); Bonham v. Morgan. 788 P.2d 497, 499 
(Utah 1998). Each of the issues below should be reviewed according to that standard. 
A. Whether Davis County has standing to contest Judge Allphin's ruling that 
Progressive had no duty to defend or indemnify Jensen? (R. 20-21,100, 
104) 
B. Whether Davis County has standing under Section 31A-22-201 where there 
has already been a ruling in the trial court that there was no coverage under 
the policy? (R. 20, 27, 104) 
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C. Whether Davis County has standing under Section 31 A-22-201 where 
Davis County has provided no evidence that its execution against Jensen 
was returned unsatisfied? (R. 24-26, 105) 
D. Whether Davis County's lawsuit is barred under the doctrines of claim and 
issue preclusion? (R. 20-24, 101-104) 
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Determinative Statutes 
Utah Code Ann.§ 31A-22-201. Required provisions of liability insurance policies 
Every liability insurance policy shall provide that the bankruptcy or insolvency of the 
insured may not diminish any liability of the insurer to third parties, and that if execution 
against the insured is returned unsatisfied, an action may be maintained against the 
insurer to the extent that the liability is covered by the policy. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case arises out of an automobile accident wherein Davis County alleged that 
James Jensen caused property damage to a police vehicle. This lawsuit is Davis County's 
second attempt to claim property damage allegedly caused by James Jensen. In an earlier 
lawsuit before Judge Michael Allphin in the Second Judicial District, Davis County 
claimed that James Jensen caused property damage to a police vehicle and that 
Progressive was obligated to provide coverage because Jensen had purchased insurance 
coverage from Progressive. Progressive moved for summary judgment that there was no 
coverage because Jensen's acts were excluded under an intentional acts exclusion found 
in the insurance contract. Judge Allphin decided the coverage issue in favor of 
Progressive, Davis County appealed and the Utah Court of Appeals affirmed the trial 
court's ruling finding that Davis County lacked standing. Jensen never appealed the 
issue. 
After the Utah Court of Appeals issued its decision, the Utah Supreme Court took 
up a similar issue in Speros v. Fricke, 2004 UT 69, 98 P.3d 28 (Utah 2004). In that case, 
the court determined that the intentional acts exclusion found in many insurance policies 
was unenforceable. Davis County is now relying on that later case in hopes of being 
allowed to re-litigate with Progressive. However, it does not matter whether the Speros 
court reached a different conclusion than the one reached by Judge Allphin and the Utah 
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Court of Appeals because Davis County's current claims are barred by res judicata. 
Davis County has already tried its case against Progressive, and it is not entitled to a 
second bite at the apple. The trial court in this case ruled that Davis County lacked 
standing under U.C.A. § 31A-22-201 to bring a direct cause of action against Progressive 
because Davis County had not made an attempt to execute judgment that has been 
returned unsatisfied. The trial court also ruled that Davis County's claim that Progressive 
must provide insurance coverage for Jensen's conduct is barred by the doctrines of claim 
and issue preclusion. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
1. On or about June 20, 1998, James Jensen operated a vehicle and caused 
plaintiffs vehicle, a 1997 Ford Crown Victoria operated by officer Lane E. Gleave, to 
collide with a 1997 Freightliner operated by Luis Antonio Ferrer. (R. \%)\See Davis 
County v. Jensen, 2003 UT App 444, ^|2, 83 P.3d 405 (Utah Ct. App. 2003). 
2. Davis County brought an earlier lawsuit in Second District Court against 
James Jensen and Progressive. Id. See Jensen, 2003 UT App at ^ 2. 
3. Based on the intentional acts exclusion in its insurance policy, the trial court 
ruled that Progressive did not owe coverage to Jensen and did not owe Jensen a duty to 
provide a defense. (R. 19, 30-39); See Jensen, 2003 UT App at p . 
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4. "When Jensen failed to provide his own defense, the trial court entered a 
default judgment against him in the amount of $17,209.88." (R. 19); See Jensen, 2003 
UTAppat1{4. 
5. Thereafter, Progressive filed a motion for summary judgment asking the 
trial court to grant summary judgment that Progressive could not be held liable for 
Jensen's conduct because: (1) Davis County lacked standing to sue Progressive; and (2) 
Progressive had no duty to defend or indemnify Jensen because the collision was not an 
accident, and because coverage was excluded under the intentional acts exclusion. (R. 
19); See Jensen, 2003 UT App at f|3-5. 
6. The trial court "granted Progressive's motion for summary judgment after 
concluding that Progressive had no duty to indemnify or defend because Jensen's conduct 
placed him outside the scope of coverage under the Policy." (R. 19); See Jensen, 2003 
UT App at Tf5; {see also (R. 30-39) Trial Court Ruling). 
7. On February 6, 2003, Davis County's case against Progressive was 
dismissed with prejudice. (R. 3); See also (R. 30-39) Trial Court Ruling) 
8. Davis County appealed the ruling of the trial court, and that ruling was 
affirmed by the Utah Court of Appeals on the basis that Davis County lacked standing. 
(R. 19); See Jensen, 2003 UT App at [^19 n.7 ("Because our holding that the County lacks 
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standing to bring its claims against Progressive is dispositive, we do not reach the other 
issues raised by the County on appeal."). 
9. Jensen never appealed the trial court's decision that Progressive did not owe 
a duty to defend or indemnify. (See Record). 
10. Davis County has alleged that as a result of the underlying accident, its 
"vehicle was damaged in the sum of $14,638.54, and Davis County was deprived of its 
use during its repair in an amount to be determined at trial." (R. 19); (Complaint ^ 3.) 
11. This is the second time Davis County has made that allegation. (R. 19). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
Davis County continues to lack standing, in either contract or tort, to bring a cause 
of action against Progressive. Davis County is a third party to the insurance contract 
between Progressive and Jensen. In the previous suit, Davis County argued that Jensen 
was covered under Progressive's policy. The trial judge, Judge Allphin, granted summary 
judgment in favor of Progressive concluding that Progressive had no duty to indemnify or 
defend because Jensen's conduct placed him outside the scope of coverage under the 
Policy. Davis County appealed this decision to the Utah Court of Appeals, but Jensen did 
not. The court of appeals upheld Judge Allphin's ruling on the basis that Davis County 
lacked standing to raise the issue of coverage between Progressive and Jensen. Davis 
County is now attempting to reargue the same positions it took before Judge Allphin 
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under the guise of Utah Code Annotated 31A-22-201. However, Davis County's instant 
lawsuit is deficient because Davis County lacks standing to contest the judicial 
determination that there is no coverage for Jensen under Progressive's policy. 
Because of Judge Allphin's prior ruling, Section 201 is inapplicable in this case. 
Section 201 allows an action against an insurer where execution against the insured is 
returned unsatisfied if "the liability is covered by the policy." Not only does Davis County 
lack standing to raise the issue of coverage, but Judge Allphin already ruled that there is 
no liability coverage under Progressive's policy for Jensen's conduct. That decision is 
binding, and cannot be undone by the retroactive application of subsequent case law. 
Furthermore, Davis County has failed to demonstrate that its execution against 
Jensen has been returned unsatisfied. In response to discovery requests, Davis County 
alleges without any record evidence or documentary support, that it is unable to locate 
Jensen. This is not sufficient to demonstrate that the execution is returned unsatisfied as 
required by Section 201. The plain language of Section 201 requires that the unsatisfied 
execution must be due to the bankruptcy or insolvency of the insurer. Davis County 
alleges that its supposed failure to execute on the judgment is due to its inability to locate 
Jensen, not because Jensen is in bankruptcy or insolvent. 
Davis County's lawsuit is also barred by the doctrines of claim preclusion and 
issue preclusion. The elements of claim preclusion are met which bars Davis County's 
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lawsuit. First, both Davis County and Progressive were parties to the first suit. There 
were many issues before the Judge Allphin; including whether Progressive was required 
to provide coverage for Jensen's conduct, and whether Davis County had standing to 
directly sue Progressive. Judge Allphin held that Progressive was not required to provide 
coverage for Jensen's conduct. The first suit resulted in a final judgment on the merits 
and the case was dismissed with prejudice. 
Davis County cannot relitigate issues previously decided because the elements of 
issue preclusion are met. First, Davis County was a party to the prior adjudication. 
Second, the issues of whether Progressive was obligated to provide coverage for Jensen's 
intentional acts and whether Davis County had standing were presented in the prior 
adjudication. Third, the issue was completely, fully and fairly litigated before Judge 
Allphin and the Utah Court of Appeals. And finally, the prior adjudication resulted in a 
final judgment on the merits. 
Contrary to Davis County's assertions, Progressive has not been holding any funds 
in a constructive trust. In 2003, Judge Allphin ruled that there was no insurance coverage 
under the policy. That decision was not reversed on appeal, and Davis County has no 
legal basis to contend that there are any insurance funds available under Progressive's 
contract with Jensen. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. DAVIS COUNTY CONTINUES TO LACK STANDING TO ARGUE 
WHETHER THERE IS COVERAGE UNDER PROGRESSIVE'S POLICY. 
The Utah Court of Appeals has already ruled that Davis County, as a third party to 
the insurance contract between Jensen and Progressive, "lacks standing to bring its claims 
against Progressive." Davis County v. Jensen, 2003 UT App 444, PI9. Davis County 
lacked standing, both in contract and in tort to challenge whether Jensen was covered 
under Progressive's policy. Id. While Davis County obscures the fact that it is doing so 
by raising it at the end of its argument, Davis County is ultimately again challenging 
Judge Allphin's decision that Jensen was not covered under his policy with Progressive. 
See, Appellant's Brief, p. 24-26 ("Progressive's policy unquestionably provided coverage 
for Jensen"). Davis County still lacks standing to contest this issue. 
Davis County argues that the Utah Supreme Court decision of Speros v. Fricke, 
2004 UT 69, 98 P.3d 28 (Utah 2004), would change the outcome of Judge Allphin's 
decision that there was no coverage for Jensen's intentional act under Progressive's 
exclusion in its policy. Judge Allphin's ruling, however, was issued prior to Speros, and 
Davis County's contention is erroneous. Under Utah law "a rendered judgment is final 
for purposes of res judicata until reversed on appeal, modified by the rendering court, or 
set aside by the rendering court." Youren v. Tintic Sch. Dist, 2004 UT App. 33, P3 n.2, 
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86 P.3d 771 (Utah Ct. App. 2004). Because none of those conditions have been met, 
Judge Allphin's decision was final, and Davis County's claims are barred. 
Davis County also contends that it must be afforded a full and fair opportunity to 
litigate the issue of coverage. The law however states that a third party has no standing to 
contest coverage. Davis County v. Jensen, 2003 UT App 444, PI9. Davis County 
erroneously assumes that Section 201 grants standing to challenge coverage. Section 201 
states that if there is coverage, then the plaintiff has standing to enforce coverage-there is 
no grant of standing to challenge an exclusionary provision in an insurance policy. 
Furthermore, this is not a subrogation claim and Davis County cannot step into the shoes 
of Jensen, as it attempts to do once again. The Court should uphold the trial court's grant 
of summary judgment to Progressive. 
II. SPEROS CANNOT BE APPLIED RETROACTIVELY BECAUSE THERE 
WAS NO CHANGE IN THE LAW. 
The Court's 2004 decision in Speros does not entitle Davis County to relitigate the 
issue of Progressive's coverage because there has been no change in law. See, Collins v. 
Sandy City Bd Of Adjustment, 2002 UT 77, P14, 52 P.3d 1267 (Utah 2002) ("a change in 
law may allow a party to avoid the effect of issue preclusion"). "To invoke this exception, 
a party must establish that a new substantive right has been created." Id. [^14. "Whether a 
new substantive right has been created by a judicial opinion issued after the partyfs 
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original suit has been decided, however, requires, at a minimum, an actual change in the 
law." Id, In Collins, a similar issue was addressed, and the court held that the plaintiffs' 
claims were barred because "no change in the law occurred." Id. ]fl3. 
Like in Collins, the plaintiffs claims in this case are barred because Speros did not 
create a change in the law. Despite the fact that Judge Allphin's decision was different 
then the subsequent ruling in Speros, no actual changed in the law occurred. Prior to 
Speros, no appellate court in Utah had ever held that the intentional acts exclusion was 
invalid under the Utah motor vehicle insurance code. However, there was no change to 
the code, and Speros's interpretation of the code did not alter or amend a substantive right 
in any way. The Collins court explained an identical situation as follows: 
Prior to Brown, no appellate court of this state had ever held that short- term 
rentals were invalid under the Land Development Code interpreted in 
Brown. The fact that the district court held in Collins I that the ordinance 
barred short-term rentals and the court of appeals held in Brown that the 
ordinance did not bar short-term rentals does not mean that the law changed 
between those two judicial decisions. The law remained the same. The 
district court in Collins I simply interpreted the ordinance in a manner 
rejected by the court of appeals in Brown . . . Accordingly, the change in 
law exception relied on by the Collinses has no application to the present 
case. 
Id ^15. Like in Collins, the law governing these issues remained the same, and the mere 
fact that Judge Allphin interpreted it in a manner later rejected by the Speros court does 
not mean that there was a change in the law. The law remained the same, and Davis 
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County not only lacks standing to raise this issue, but its claims are barred by issue 
preclusion. 
III. SECTION 201 DOES NOT GRANT DAVIS COUNTY STANDING UNDER 
THE FACTS OF THIS CASE. 
U.C.A. § 31A-22-201 has several requirements before a third party may maintain 
an action against the insurer: 
Every liability insurance policy shall provide that the bankruptcy or insolvency of 
the insured may not diminish any liability of the insurer to third parties, and that if 
execution against the insured is returned unsatisfied, an action may be maintained 
against the insurer to the extent that the liability is covered by the policy. 
First, Section 201 requires that the liability must be covered by the policy. Not only does 
Davis County lack standing to raise this issue, but Judge Allphin already ruled that Jensen 
was not covered under Progressive's policy, and that ruling is binding. Another 
requirement is that the execution must be returned unsatisfied. Davis County has not 
provided any evidence that the execution has been returned unsatisfied. The third 
requirement is that the unsatisfied execution arise out of the bankruptcy or insolvency of 
the insured. Once again, Davis County has not provided any evidence that the execution 
was returned unsatisfied, whether by bankruptcy or insolvency. In fact, Davis County 
alleges, without providing any evidence in support, that its execution is unsatisfied 
because Jensen cannot be found. Davis County lacks standing because it has not fulfilled 
any of Section 201 !s requirements. 
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A. Davis County Lacks Standing to Bring a Direct Cause of Action 
Against Progressive Because The Liability is Not Covered Under the 
Policy. 
The Utah Court of Appeals has already determined Davis County lacks standing to 
bring a direct cause of action against Progressive. See Davis County v. Jensen, 2003 UT 
App 444, 83 P.3d 405 (Utah Ct. App. 2003). Additionally, Davis County lacks standing 
to sue Progressive because Utah Code Ann. §31A-22-201 only allows standing " to the 
extent that the liability is covered by the policy." See, Speros v. Fricke, 98 P.3d at 31 
(analysis under Section 201 starts with whether there is coverage under the policy). This 
Court already determined that Davis County does not have the ability to contest this issue 
between Progressive and Jensen. In the first case, Judge Allphin determined that "there is 
no coverage under the policy language" because "Defendant Jensen's act was not an 
'accident' within the regular meaning of the word." (R. 37-39). 
Davis County overlooks the critical fact that Judge Allphin decided that there was 
no insurance coverage for Jensen's conduct. Davis County has argued that it is not bound 
by the trial court's decision because "[t]he Jensen court held that Davis County had no 
'standing' to challenge Progressive's interpretation of its insurance policy." (R. 80; 
Appellant's Brief p. 10). Regardless of whether Davis County had standing as a third 
party, however, the trial court's decision regarding Jensen's insurance coverage is binding 
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between Jensen and Progressive. See Utah Farm Bureau Ins. Co. v. Chugg, 315 P.2d 
277, 281 (Utah 1957) ("The tort victim has no present legal interest in the insurance 
contract. To drag him into the declaratory judgment action is to import into it a totally 
different controversy."); Allstate Ins. Co. v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 619 P.2d 
329, 333-334 (Utah 1980) ("An injured party is a stranger to the tortfeasor's insurance 
contract and hence, has no legal interest in the enforcement of that contract nor a right to 
sue thereon.") The issue of insurance coverage was presented to the trial court for 
decision, and the trial court determined that there was no coverage. Davis County has 
raised the issue of the effect of the Speros decision, however, Davis County still lacks 
standing to raise the issue of coverage, and Judge Allphin's decision is binding. Based on 
that determination, Davis County has no standing under §31A-22-201. 
B. Davis County Has Provided No Evidence that Execution Has Been 
Returned Unsatisfied. 
As interpreted by the Utah Supreme Court, an "insurer is subject to a direct action 
by a third party only 'if execution against the insured is returned unsatisfied.'" Speros v. 
Fricke, 2004 UT 69, f 54, 98 P.3d 28 (Utah 2004). In Speros, the plaintiff similarly 
argued that it had standing under §31 A-22-201 because the insured was deceased and any 
collection efforts would prove futile. See id. f 55. However, the Speros court disagreed 
because there was no evidence that the plaintiff had "actually attempted an execution 
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against [the insured's] estate that was returned unsatisfied." Id. The court stated that "an 
unsatisfied attempt to execute on a judgment against an insured is a prerequisite element 
of [the plaintiffs] right to pursue a direct action against [the insurance company]." Id. 
Davis County is erroneous in its contention that it has standing to bring a direct 
action against Progressive under Utah Code Ann. §31A-22-201. Davis County has 
provided no evidence that an attempt to execute a judgment against Jensen has been 
returned unsatisfied. Through discovery, Progressive asked Davis County to produce 
evidence of an attempted execution, but none was produced. Progressive sent 
interrogatories and requests for production of documents to the plaintiff, but Davis 
County did not provide any evidence to satisfy the standing requirement set forth by law. 
(R. 66-75). In addition, Progressive sent Davis County Requests for Admission, and 
according to Davis County's responses, the sole basis for Davis County's claim is that it 
cannot locate Jensen. Id. Davis County has not provided any evidence of its alleged 
efforts to locate Jensen. Davis County's inability to locate Jensen is not sufficient to 
grant standing, however, and the Court should affirm the trial court's decision. 
Davis County asks the Court to sit in equity and ignore the legal requirement of 
§31 A-22-201 that an execution must be returned unsatisfied.1 Davis County concedes 
!The case of Paul v. Kirkendall, 311 P.2d 376, 377 (Utah 1957) is an example of a case in 
which an "execution was returned unsatisfied." Id. In that case, the plaintiff received a $ 20,000 
jury verdict "for personal injuries arising out of an automobile accident." Id. The defendant's 
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that it did not attempt an execution, but claims that it is excused from doing so because 
equity does not require it to conduct an exercise in futility.2 In support of its argument, 
Davis County relied on Wood/in Equities Corp. v. Harford Mut. Ins. Co. 110 Md. App. 
616 (Md. App. 1995). Davis County argues it is like the third party in Wood/in that did 
not file "any documents with respect to attempting to satisfy the judgment" based on a 
similar statute in Maryland, because it would been an exercise in futility. 110 Md. App. 
at 638. Wood/in, however, actually supports Progressive's argument that evidence must 
be provided. While no documents were provided in Woodfin by the third party seeking to 
collect from the insurer on an unsatisfied judgment against the insured, the Woodfin 
court's statements were based on the fact that there had been substantial testimony at trial, 
and by deposition that the execution on the insured would be futile. Id. at 637-638. 
There was testimony that the third party had hired a private investigator to search for 
assets of the insured but could not find any. Id. There was also deposition testimony that 
the insured's assets were sold, the company had closed, and the principal had left the 
insurer paid the policy limits of $10,000. See id. The execution was returned unsatisfied because 
the plaintiff made an effort to collect on the judgment but only received $10,000 out of the 
$20,000 verdict. See id. 
2Davis County cites to U.C.A. § 68-3-2 for the proposition that when there is a conflict 
between common law and equity "the rules of equity prevail." Here however, there is a statute 
which governs, and "[t]he statutes establish the laws of this state respecting the subjects to which 
they relate." U.C.A. § 68-3-2. 
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United States for Canada. Id. Here there is just an allegation from Davis County that it 
cannot locate Jensen, without stating what efforts, if any, it has made. 
Davis County's interpretation of Section 201 contradicts the plain language of the 
statute, and contradicts the reasoning of the Utah Supreme Court. In Speros, the Utah 
Supreme Court rejected an argument that it would be futile to attempt a collection against 
the defendant because the defendant was deceased. Speros v. Fricke, 2004 UT 69, [^55, 
98 P.3d 28 (Utah 2004). The Court expressly declared that "an unsatisfied attempt to 
execute on a judgment against an insured is a prerequisite element of . . . [the] right to 
pursue a direct action against [a tortfeasor's insurer]." Id. Because Davis County has not 
produced any evidence that it made an attempt to execute its judgment against Jensen, 
Davis County continues to lack standing. 
C. The Execution Must Be Returned Unsatisfied Due to the Insolvency or 
Bankruptcy of the Insured. 
Section 201 is entitled "Required provisions of liability insurance policies." 
U.C.A. § 31A-22-201. It requires that all liability insurance policies "shall provide that 
the bankruptcy or insolvency of the insured may not diminish any liability of the insurer 
to third parties." Id. According to the plain language of the Section 201, only unsatisfied 
executions due to the "bankruptcy or insolvency" of the insured are sufficient to rest 
standing in a third party to a liability policy. 
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Davis County contends, without any supportive evidence, that its execution against 
Jensen is returned unsatisfied because Jensen "cannot be located." That is not sufficient 
to confer standing under Section . -;. , ,\;\; . t ounty provided no w idence that Jensen 
filed Ini kinkiiipkN m is others is*.1 fiisnlunl Neeonlin; (i.llin jplain language of Setlion 
201, Davis County's failure to execute on its judgment due to its alleged inability to 
locate Jensen, does not satisfy the prerequisite for standing, and the Court should affirm 
the trial u»ii»1""s decision. 
IV. DAVIS COUNTY'S LAWSUIT IS BARRED UNDER THF 
CLAIM PRECLUSION AND ISSUE PRECLUSION 
This Court should uphold the trial court's grant of summary judgment for 
Progressive because Davis County's claims are barred by claim preclusion. Davis 
Michael G. Allphin on February 6, 2003. In that ruling, Judge Allphin found that 
Jensen's conduct was intentional and "Progressive's duty to defend and duty to provide 
insurance coverage is relieved in this case.' I he court entered its ruling on two bases. 
First, Ihc court lound llul there v as no vou'raue I'm llie incident because it was iiu( ,m 
accident within the definition of the policy. Id. at 6-8. Second, the court found that 
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Jensen acted intentionally and thus coverage was excluded under the intentional acts 
exclusion.3 Id. 5-7. 
Davis County disagreed with the trial court's decision and appealed the issue. 
Jensen, however did not appeal and the Utah Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's 
dismissal on the basis that Davis County lacked standing, and the Utah Supreme Court 
denied Davis County's petition for certiorari on April 28, 2004. See Davis County v. 
Jensen, 2003 UT App 444, %2, 83 P.3d 405 (Utah Ct. App. 2003),cert denied at Davis v. 
Jensen, 90 P.3d 1041 (Utah 2004). 
"[T]he doctrine of res judicata, 'precludes the relitigation of all issues and claims 
that could have been litigated as well as those that were, in fact, litigated in the prior 
action.'" State v. Garner, 2005 UT 6, f 8, 106 P.3d 729 (Utah 2005). The doctrine of res 
judicata has two branches, claim preclusion and issue preclusion. Brigham Young Univ. 
v. Tremco Consultants, Inc., 2005 UT 19, TJ26-28, HO P.3d 678 (Utah 2005). Progressive 
requests that the Court affirm summary judgment under both branches of res judicata 
because it was inappropriate for Davis County to ask Judge Henriod to sit as an appellate 
court over the decision made in the district court by Judge Allphin. Davis County's 
3It is important to draw a distinction between the two bases for the Judge Allphin's 
decision. If the incident was not an "accident," then the policy did not provide coverage in the 
first place because the policy only provided coverage for accidents. On the other hand, if the 
incident falls under the "intentional acts exclusion," that means there was coverage under the 
policy, but coverage was excluded under that contractual provision. Cf. Speros v. Fricke, 2004 
UT 69, 98 F.3d 28 (Utah 2004) (holding an intentional acts exclusion unenforceable). 
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remedy was to seek appellate review of Judge Allphin's decision. Davis County exercised 
that remedy, and Judge Allphin's decision was affirmed by this Court. 
A. Day CClaims are Barred by Claim Preclusion 
In order to establish chum preclusion. (IK1 in*T\ iitii, p;n 1 > must imri HHXY deiikiik 
First, both cases must involve the same parties or their privies. Second, the 
claim that is alleged to be barred must have been presented in the first suit 
or must be one that could and should have been raised in the first action. 
Third, the first suit must have resulted in a final judgment on the merits. 
Inm ,/• •7\./- '« - . j j , f ) , 8f- P.I.I 7,p| | IH ( | | |< '( \|>|,. J IH Ih . 
There can be no dispute that each element of claim preclusion has been satisfied. 
First, both Davis County and Progressive were parties to the first suit. Second, there w ere 
many issues before the district court; including whether Progressive was required to 
directly sue Progressive. And third, the first suit resulted in a final judgment on the 
merits and the case was dismissed with prejudice. 
Davis County argued that J udge i Ulphin' s decision was not binding because it was 
invalidated by the subsequent Speros decision. I Jnder ( J tali law ., "a rendered ji ldgment is 
final for purposes ofres judicata until reversed on appeal, modified by the rendering 
court, or set aside by the rendering court." Id. %3 n.2. Because none of those conditions 
ha\ e been met, Ji idge i \ llphiii s decision was fi^ai. and Davis County' s claims are barred. 
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Davis County also contends that Judge Allphin's decision regarding the lack of 
coverage for Jensen was not binding because the appellate court found that Davis County 
lacked standing, and therefore, Davis County was not a party to the proceedings. Davis 
County was the plaintiff who filed the lawsuit against Jensen and Progressive. The party 
requirement of claim preclusion is to insure that there is a "sufficiently close identity of 
interests." Conder v. Hunt, 2000 UT App 105, P10 (Utah Ct. App. 2000). Davis County 
fully briefed and argued the issue of coverage to Judge Allphin, and again to the Court of 
Appeals. Davis County's interests, that there would be coverage for Jensen under the 
policy, were fully represented. Davis County cites to St. Pierre and Que-Van Transport 
v. Dyer, 208 F.3d 394 (2nd Cir. 1999) in support of its argument. St. Pierre ruled that 
there was no res judicata effect because there was no standing due to the lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction over one of the parties, the plaintiff. Here, the district court had 
subject matter jurisdiction over Progressive and Jensen when it ruled that there was no 
coverage for Jensen under Progressive policy. For these reasons, the Court should affirm 
summary judgment in favor of Progressive. 
B. Davis County's Claims are Barred by Issue Preclusion 
The Court should also grant summary judgment because Davis County's claims are 
barred by issue preclusion. "It is well settled that the doctrine of 'issue preclusion 
prevents the relitigation of issues in a subsequent action.'" Collins v. Sandy City Bd. of 
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Adjustment, 2002 UT 77,1]12, 52 P.3d 1267 (Utah 2002). This doctrine applies if four 
elements are satisfied: 
(I) the party against whom issue preclusion is asserted must have been a 
party to or in privity with a party to the prior adjudication; (ii) the issue 
decided in the prior adjudication must be identical to the one presented in 
the instant action; (iii) the issue in the first action must have been 
completely, fully, and fairly litigated; and (iv) the first suit must have 
resulted in a final judgment on the merits. 
Id 
Under these elements, Dav is Coi mt> 5s claims ai e • ba i i ed First,, Da \ is County was 
a party to the prior adjudication. Second, the issues of whether IV* mi i M X ^ w <i ' . 
to provide coverage for Jensen ' s intentional acts and whether Davis County had standing 
were presented in the prior adjudication. Third, the issue was completely, fully and fairly 
adjudication resulted in a final judgment on the merits. 
Davis County asks the Court to allow it to relitigate the issue of Progressive 's 
coverage citing to the decision in Speros, which came after Judge Al lphin 's ruling As 
discussed a h o \ r lliere lui^ Iv* ii no rhanjje in Ihe Lim lli.il nnmlnl . I \UHI Ihe ufTcet \A i • m 
preclusion. Like in Collins, the law governing these issues remained the same, and the 
mere fact that Judge Allphin interpreted it in a manner later rejected by the Speros court 
does not mean that there was a change in the law. The law remained the same, and Davis 
County 's claims ai e barred b> issi le pi ech ision. 
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V, THE DECISIONS MADE IN THE UNDERLYING SUIT RESULTED IN A 
FINAL JUDGMENT ON THE MERITS. 
It also appears that Davis County has argued that the decisions of the trial court 
and the appellate court were not final decisions on the merits. In support of its position, 
Davis County has cited to several old cases from various jurisdictions for the proposition 
that an appeal that does not specifically address every single issue tried in a case has no 
preclusive effect. Utah, however, has not adopted that rule, but has instead adopted the 
position that "[i]t must be presumed from a general judgment that all the issues were 
decided in favor of the successful party." Peay v. Salt Lake City, 40 P. 206, 208 (Utah 
1895) (quotation omitted). The Peay court explained that 
The defendant can only be called upon to answer the material allegations of 
the complaint, and upon such allegations the issue is formed, and, when 
judgment is rendered thereon by a court of exclusive jurisdiction, it is 
conclusive between the parties, upon the same matters, unless set aside by a 
court of last resort. And such a judgment is final, not only as to the matter 
actually determined, but also as to every other matter which might have 
been litigated by the parties, as part of the subject in controversy, but which 
was omitted from the case through negligence, or inadvertence, or even 
accident. 
Id; see also Logan City v. Utah Power & Light Co., 44 P.2d 698, 699 (Utah 1935); 
Youren, 2004 UT App. 33, P3 n.2. As stated by another court, "[i]t is no uncommon 
practice for courts, where several points are raised for determination, to affirm the case 
upon one point, and to say that, as to the other points, the decision of the court below was 
correct. All such questions, whether of fact or law, are then res adjudicata, and in another 
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suit, brought for the same cause of action, it is of no importance whether the conclusions, 
either of fact or law, are right or wrong." Hall v. Kalamazoo, 141 Mich. 503. 505 (Mich. 
1 : . 
I he instant case, the issues of Iiisiii ance cm ei age \ v ere material issues that \ v ere 
adjudicated after a contest by final judgment on the merits. I he mere fact that the 
appellate court affirmed the decision on alternative grounds and did not expressly address 
tl derlying coverage issues does not rob the trial court's decision , -\ ;s finality or its 
p: ! ^ • > •': • * • * * * reqi lire appellate 
courts to address every issue that is ever appealed (regardless of whether the issues have 
merit) or run the risk of having cases continuously litigated over and over again. 
Furthermore, llie cases relied upon by Davis County predate the modern 
same principles that now constitute the modern tests.4 See Searle Bros. v. Searle, 588 
P.2d 689 (Utah 1978) (adopting a four-part test for collateral estoppel). For example, 
Speye i and Mo? < in 7 b w ingdi e cases that dealt w itl I the first prong of the test, i.e. A-naner 
theparties were represented in ihc fMi' I IL : ;^ . , / - W - . ; \ ,
 : .,.,.-. ,-"•-. £ 
1
 Nodland v. Nokota Co., 314 N.W.2d 89, 91 (N.D. 1981) is not applicable 
because that case had no preclusive effect due to the fact that the appellate court 
reversed the trial court's decision. 
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Rubber Co., 295 A.2d 143, 144 (Penn. 1972). In analyzing Speyer, the District of 
Columbia Court of Appeals explained that 
Neither the Restatement nor Speyer stands for the proposition that an 
appellate court's failure to reach a particular issue (or even to specify at all 
the basis for affirmance) robs the judgment of claim preclusive effect. 
Speyer squarely held that 'a trial court's finding of fact which is not relied 
upon by an appellate court in affirming a judgment is not conclusive against 
one of the parties who brings a subsequent suit against a non-party, in 
which the fact is in issue.5 
Carr v. Rose, 701 A.2d 1065, 1074 (D.C. 1997) (quoting Speyer, 295 A.2d at 147) 
(emphasis added); see also Moran Towing & Transp. Co. v. Navigazione Libera 
Triestina, S A., 92 F.2d 37, 40 (2d Cir. 1937) ("To treat as controlling the findings of a 
trial court when the appellate court upsets or disregards them and renders a decision of 
affirmance on different grounds furnishes parties to other litigations affected by the 
decision a false guide." (emphasis added)). 
Likewise, Hannahville Indian Community v. United States, 180 Ct. CI. 477, 485 
(Ct. Claim 1967) is a case that dealt with the third prong, i.e. whether the issue in the first 
action was completely, fully, and fairly litigated. In that case, the Indian Claims 
Commission decided a case based on res judicata after relying on facts from a prior case 
that were not essential to the judgment. See id. at 483. The Court of Claims explained, 
however, that 
Contrary to the Commission majority's understanding, this court did not 
decide the 'immaterial' question of the political structure of the 
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Potawatomies in the Western Lands case. While we did express agreement 
with the Commission's conclusion that the Potawatomi tribe was composed 
of numerous autonomous bands, our agreement was premised entirely upon 
'the facts found5 by the Commission. We did not look behind those facts to 
determine whether they were supported by substantial evidence, as would 
have been our obligation had we undertaken to approve the Commission's 
determination of the political structure question. Since we did not decide 
the question of the political structure of the Potawatomi Indians during the 
treaty period, the decision of this court in the Western Lands case could not 
bar relitigation of the issue. 
M at 484. 
Riilht.'i lli.iii id) mi1 mi dirln from mifdnlal .uses Hit \ 'nml she ~.-: -
modern tests for issue preclusion and claim preclusion promulgated by the Utah appellate 
courts. Under those tests, Davis County's claims are barred because Davis County is 
merely seeking to reargue issues that have been previously decided. 
A. Plaintiffs Equitable Arguments Are Not Only Barred by Res Jud» 
but They Are Also Meritless. 
Plaintiffs position that this is an action quasi in rem to collect the corpus of a 
constr ucti v e trust is erroneous because there is no constructive trust and there is no 
corpus. As previously explained, Jtu-:c MlpI «! ••- >! >LMCS \. ^ \o 
no obligation to indemnify Jensen. That means there is no insurance coverage for Jensen. 
The appellate court did not reverse that decision, and Davis County has no legal basis 
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upon which it can contend that there are insurance proceeds available under Progressive's 
contract with Jensen.5 
Davis County has also argued that Progressive has "erected artificial barriers to the 
administration of justice;" however, nothing is further from the truth. The legal issues of 
the underlying case were fully and fairly presented to the district court. Davis County 
argued its position to the district court and the appellate court, and those courts ruled 
against Davis County. Davis County's allegations of bad faith are unfounded and 
meritless. Progressive did exactly what the law anticipates a defendant should do—it 
defended its legal interests. 
CONCLUSION 
As a third party Davis County continues to lack standing to contest whether there 
is coverage for Jensen under the policy. Section 201 requires that there be liability 
coverage before a third party may invoke the unsatisfied execution provision. Davis 
County has no standing to challenge coverage, and Judge Allphin already ruled that there 
was no coverage under the policy. That decision is binding. Davis County also lacks 
standing because it has provided no evidence that its judgment was returned unsatisfied. 
5
 The case law Davis County cited in support of its constructive trust theory was 
taken from the dissenting opinion of a case from 1954. See Utah Coop. Ass'n v White 
Distrib. & Supply Co., 275 P.2d 687, 694 (Utah 1954) (Justice Crockett dissenting). 
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Both claim preclusion and issue preclusion also bar Davis County's case against 
Progressive. Judge Henriod's order granting summary judgment to Progressive should be 
affirmed. 
Dated this the 3( ila\ nf PvLkli ?()(IN ' ' ', . 
J. JOYCE & ASSOCIATES 
)yc/ 
)efendant " \ ppellee 
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